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2The R
This paperanalyzes the regulation ofentry into banking through
government chartering. Entry regulations are shown to be necessary
for other anticompetitive regulations to succeed in raising industry
profits to above-normal levels. Empirically, we find that although
regulation reduced entry during the 1936-1962 period, entry re-
strictions appear to have been relaxed since then. Ifentry has been
unrestrictedfor some time, the deregulation ofdeposit rates orother
forms of banking deregulation are unlikely to affect the aggregate
profits ofthe banking industry, at least in the long-run.
Commercial banking in the United States is
a highly regulated industry. Banking regula-
tions pervade almost every aspect of the busi-
ness, including whether, how and where a bank
can do business. Ostensibly, the primary ration-
ale for banking regulation is to protect and pro-
mote the safety and soundness of the financial
system. Indeed, recently, as bank failures have
mounted, some have called for increased
regulation.
As a legacy of the 1930s, many banking reg-
ulations were implemented that did not deal di-
rectly with safety and soundness issues, but in-
stead, restricted competition among banks
themselves and between banks and other finan-
cial institutions. For example, various restric-
tions on entry, such as government control of
chartering, geographic restrictions on branch-
ing, and product-line restrictions, at least have
the potential to reduce competition.
Other regulations that do not deal with entry,
such as consumer deposit rate ceilings, also
have the potential to lessen competition. In
fact,some economists have argued that the reg-
ulation of entry as well as other anti-competi-
tive measures reflect the "capture" of the reg-
ulators by the regulated firms. Since banks as
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a group have an interest in restricting compe-
tition (and thereby generating economic rents),
they would promote regulations that would
eliminate or reduce interbank competition or
reduce competition from nonbank firms that
provide substitute services.
Currently, many ofthese restrictions on bank
competition are breaking down. Deposit-rate
ceilings essentially have been eliminated on all
but business checking accounts. Geographic re-
strictions are diminishing through the liberali-
zation of branching laws and through regional
interstate compacts. They are also being
evaded through various legal loopholes such as
"nonbank" banks.! Product-line distinctions
between banks and nondepository financial
firms also are blurring. What will be the im-
pacts of these changes? Is banking becoming
more competitive and less profitable, and will
bank failures consequently mount as profits de-
cline?2 Or, will deregulation merely change the
way banks compete with each other rather than
increase the overall degree of competition?
The answers to these questions depend in
large part on how effective entry regulations
have been in actually reducing entry.3 In gen-
eral, anticompetitive regulations that fix prices
would be effective in reducing the degree of
competition only if entry also were restricted.
This is because if entry is not limited, the reg-
ulation of prices will not be able to suppress
nonprice competition by new entrants. Con-versely,ifentry is restricted, the degree ofcom-
petition generally will be reduced even without
other anticompetitive restrictions.
Purpose and Organization
The objectives Of this paper are·threefold.
First, we analyze, in general, the effects of the
government regulation ofentry into an industry
and the interaction of entry regulation with
othertypes ofregulation. We show that without
entry restrictions, other regulations seeking to
limit competition will be ineffective in the cre-
ation ofeconomic rents. However, anticompeti-
tive regulations may very well alter the form of
competition. Conversely, effective entry regu-
lations generally will limit competition and
thereby create economic rents even in the ab-
sence ofother anticompetitive restrictions. Sec-
ond, we apply this general analytic framework
to the banking industry. We analyze empirically
how regulation has affected the rate of entry
into banking··and ..whether entry restrictions
have been relaxed recently. Finally, the impli-
cations of the current deregulatory trend in
banking are explored in light of our findings
about the regulation of bank entry.
Section I examines how entry restrictions
alone or in conjunction with other regulations
in theory would affect competition in banking.
Then, in Section II, data on bank entry are ana-
lyzed to assess whether actual entry has been
limited. Section III presents the summary and
conclusions.
I. The Theory of Entry and Competition
Entry plays a prominent role in the economic
theory of competition. Free entry is the key
economic force that ensures that there are an
optimal number of firms (from society's view-
point) in a particular industry and that individ-
ual firms charge competitive prices and operate
at optimum scales.4
In an industry in which individual firms op-
erate independently (that is, they do not col-
lude), the short-run supply curve is the (hori-
zontal) sum of the marginal cost curves of the
firms in the industry (at a particular moment
in time). If, at the price determined by supply
and demand, price is above each firm's average
cost (because individual firms have increasing
marginal costs), new firms will be attracted to
the industry until price is forced down to equal
average cost. Thus, in long-run equilibrium,
the entry of new firms ensures that price equals
(minimum) average cost (which also equals
marginal cost), that an optimal number of firms
are in the industry, and that profits are normal.
If, however, entry were restricted at less than
the socially optimal number of firms, firms
would produce at levels above their minimum
average costs, prices would exceed average
costs, and firms would enjoy above-normal
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profits (even in the absence of collusion) unless
firms were able to produce at constant costs. If
firms could produce at constant costs, so that
marginal and average costs were equal, then
restrictions on the number of firms in an in-
dustry would have no effects on prices or prof-
its as long as the firms did not collude. Thus,
constant costs of production are equivalent in a
sense to unrestricted entry.
Although there is an empirical literature that
sugge~ts that banking is characterized by con-
stant costs, at least for banks above some min-
imum size, these econometric results are incon-
sistent with a wide range of other evidence.s
First, the new theory of firm size, developed
by Rosen (1982), Oi (1983) and others, argues
that each firm may have a U-shaped cost func-
tion even though firms of widely differing sizes
appear to have similar measured average costs.6
According to this theory, any given firm will be
subject to increasing average (and marginal)
costs if it expands output beyond its equilibrium
level, holding managerial talent constant. The
apparent equality of average costs of firms of
different sizes is due to higher levels of mana-
gerial talent at larger firms and greater com-
pensation of more able managers.
Second, there is anecdotal evidence thatthere are very strong economic forces propel-
ling the nation toward interstate banking. This
suggests that there must be important scale
economies, at least in banking. Finally, if bank-
ing were characterized by constant costs, it
seemsunlikelythat such a wide variety ofTeg~
ulations regarding the scale of their operations,
such as merger regulation, chartering, and geo-
graphic restrictions would exist since such reg-
ulations would have no effect on competition,
interest rates, or the pricing of bank services.
Thus, it seems likely that, in banking, firms do
have V-shaped cost functions.
Entry and the threat of entry are also strong
forces that tend to eliminate cartels. For ex-
ample, if the firms in an originally competitive
industry (where price equaled average cost)
succeeded in forming a successful cartel that
restricted industry output by allocating output
to members (and consequently raising prices),
new firms would have a strong incentive to en-
ter because of the above-normal profits to be
earned. New firms would continue to enter un-
til price equalled average cost and profits re-
turned to normal levels. Since potential cartel
members are aware of the incentives for entry
caused by a cartel, cartels rarely form if entry
is unrestricted. Thus restrictions on entry are a
necessary precondition for other restrictions on
competition to succeed in raising firms' profits
to above-competitive levels.
Regulation and Entry Restrictions
A large number of government regulations
are either intended to restrict competition and
thereby raise the regulated firms' profits or
have that effect. However, just as private re-
strictions on competition (for example, cartels)
will be unsuccessful in restricting competition
unless entry is limited, so will government reg-
ulations. Despite the much stronger enforce-
ment tools at the government's disposal, com-
petition can take place along so many
dimensions that it is virtually impossible to pre-
vent it by regulation.
For example, suppose the government at-
tempts to restrict competition in an industry by
imposing a minimum price above the competi-
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tive level. Such an above-competitive price (rel-
ative to costs) would make an industry highly
profitable and thus attractive to enter. If price
cutting were permitted, new firms would enter
and force down prices and profits to competi-
tive.tevels··byincreasing···the···quantity .of··the
product and cutting prices.
However, even if price cutting were prohib-
ited, new firms would still enter and compete
along variousnonprice dimensions. As George
Stigler stressed in his classic 1968a article,
"Wl1en a uniform price is imposed upon, or
agreed to by, an industry, some or all of the
other terms of sale are left unregulated". For
example, competition through quality, advertis-
ing, convenience and by providing additional
nonpriced or underpriced services may all be
viable forms of nonprice competition.
Unless nonprice competition is also fully pro-
hibited, something virtually impossible to do
without assuming full control of an industry
(for example, nationalizing it), new firms will
enter and existing firms will expand their level
of nonprice competition until average costs are
driven up to equal price. Thus, without entry
restrictions, firms will compete away any po-
tential economic rents due to regulation
through nonprice competition. With entry re-
strictions, however, things are much different.
First, consider the effects ofentry restrictions
alone. If there were fewer than the socially op-
timal number offirms in an industry, then firms
would price competitively (price would equal
marginal cost) but price would exceed average
cost and the firms would earn above-normal
profits. If a regulation, such as a minimum
price, were then imposed on the industry (set
to equate industry marginal revenue with in-
dustry marginal cost), then the industry would
have the potential to earn even larger (above-
normal) profits depending on whether the po-
tential economic rents were entirely competed
away through nonprice competition. Thus, reg-
ulation has the potential to reduce competition
and increase profits only in an industry in which
entry is restricted.
But will economic rents be competed away
through nonprice competition even in an in-
dustry in which entry is restricted?With restricted entry, only eXlstmg firms
would expand the level of nonpriced services
(and goods). Assuming such firms face increas-
ing marginal costs of nonprice competition (as
is likely), existing firms would expand output
tothepointwhere the total marginal cost ofthe
product plus the nonpriced services equals de-
mand. Thus, with entry restrictions, above-
normal profitswould not be competed away un-
less nonprice competition can occur at constant
costs-something that seems highly unlikely.
Thus, regulation has the potential to increase
the profits of the regulated firms to above-nor-
mal levels, but only if entry is also limited.
Moreover, nonprice competition alone is un-
likely to lead to competitive profit levels.
Entry and Deposit Ceilings
As an example of how entry restrictions in-
teract with other regulations, consider the ef-
fects of the regulation of deposit interest rates
on consumer accounts. Initially, if a deposit-
rate ceiling were imposed below the market
rate, existing banks would earn supranormal
profits by having lower costs of deposits. This
above-normal level of profits would provide
strong incentives for both new banks to enter
and existing banks to increase levels of cOnven-
ience or nonpriced services until (average) de-
posit costs were bid up to competitive levels and
profits returned to normal levels. The effects
of the ceilings, however, would differ if entry
also were restricted.
First, consider the case where entry is unre-
stricted. As long as new banks could enter at
no cost disadvantage to existing banks, any ex-
cess profits would be eliminated in the long-
run. This is because firms would continue to
enter and provide various forms ofunderpriced
conveniences until any excess profits were elim-
inated. However, such non-priced services
would be expanded beyond the level they
would have attained in the absence of regula-
tion and, consequently, average (and marginal)
deposit costs would be higher because con-
sumers value these services at less than their
costs (that is, from a consumer's viewpoint, ser-
vices and interest are not perfect substitutes).7
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Ifexisting banks could not provide such ser-
vices and conveniences at constant costs (that
is, if existing firms face increasing marginal
costs of expanding the provision of such ser-
vices so that marginal costs exceed average
costs), new firms would be attracted to such a
regulated industry. Thus, binding deposit ceil-
ings, as well as other forms of anticompetitive
restrictions, may attract new entrants. Coun-
terbalancingthis force would be the overall de-
cline in the industry caused by its increased
costs compared to industries providing substi-
tute products that are not subject to regulation.
With unrestricted entry, deposit ceilings may
affect the type of competition and the number
of firms, but they will not affect the degree of
competition or the profitability (aggregate eco-
nomic rent) of the industry.
The effects of deposit interest ceilings gen-
erally will be very different with restricted en-
try. First, entry restrictions alone reduce the de-
mand for deposits so that rates paid on deposits
would be below levels that would prevail in the
absence of entry restrictions. Thus, if the num-
ber of banks were limited by entry restrictions,
this alone would cause deposit costs to be
lower, loan rates to be higher and, conse-
quently, profits to be higher than normal. Sec-
ond, if binding ceilings were then imposed on
such an industry, limiting deposit rates to below
the (already low) levels the firms would set
through competition with one another, the ex-
isting banks would then expand nonpriced ser-
vices up to the point where interest plus mar-
ginal service costs of deposits equaled their
marginal revenue products.
Ifindividual banks faced increasing marginal
costs of providing nonpriced services, addi-
tional services would be provided up to the
point where marginal deposit costs equaled the
value of deposits' marginal products, but aver-
age deposit costs would be less. Thus, with en-
try restrictions, consumer deposit ceilings may
confer economic rents on existing banks.
Since the effects of (nonentry) regulation and
hence deregulation on industry profitability de-
pend in large degree on whether entry was lim-
ited, we now turn to an empirical analysis of
the effects of chartering regulation on entry
into banking.II. Empirical Analysis of Chartering Restrictions
The United States has a "dual" banking sys-
tem. Currently, persons wishing to start a bank
can apply for a federal charter from the Comp-
troHer of the Currency or.apply to the.appro-
priate state banking agency for a state charter.
However, to obtain federal deposit insurance,
newly chartered state banks must either receive
approvaldirectly·from the Federal Deposit·In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) or become mem-
bersof the Federal Reserve System. (Federally
chartered banks are all members of the Federal
Reserve System and all have federal deposit
insurance.)
In general, competition among chartering
agencies would seem to limit any single agen-
cy's power to restrict entry. This is because if
one agency restricted entry severely, firms
seeking charters would go to another agency.
Over time, an agency with an overly restrictive
chartering policy would find itself with few
firms to regulate.
Prior to the creation of the FDIC and the
passage of the Banking Act of 1935, which set
up a federally administered "needs" criteria for
chartering federally insured banks, there was
active competition between the states and the
federal government for chartering banks. How-
ever, with the creation of the FDIC, the com-
petition for the chartering ofinsured banks was
probably reduced since the owners of state-
chartered banks had to apply either to the
FDIC or the Federal Reserve to obtain federal
deposit insurance. Thus, the federal govern-
ment could control the number of (federally)
insured banks, although the power to do so was
diffused through three agencies.
As thrifts have gained more bank powers re-
cently, thrift charters may be becoming good
substitutes for bank charters. Ifso, competition
from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), which controls the chartering offed-
erally insured savings and loans, may be intro-
ducing a new element of competition among
federal agencies for the chartering of deposi-
tory institutions.
Although the diffusion of chartering powers
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through several federal agencies may have in-
troduced a significant degree of interagency
competition and made entry regulation rela-
tivelyineffectiye••in•••aGtQally restrictingentry,·it
is an empirical question whether and/or to what
degree entry has been limited.
Previous Studies
In a classic study (1965) dealing with the ef-
fects of chartering on the rate of bank entry,
Sam Peltzman concluded that chartering re-
dQced.the rate of bank entry by at least.50 per-
cent compared to what would have occurred
without such restrictions. His finding is based
on a comparison of the rate of entry prior to
the passage of the Banking Act of 1935 and the
creation of the FDIC, which he characterizes
as the "free-banking" era, to the 1936-1962pe-
riod, during which he argues federal-state COm-
petition for the chartering of insured banks was
effectively eliminated.
In conducting a study to determine what the
effects of the 1935 Banking Act were, ideally
one would want to control for all factors other
than the passage of the Act that might affect
entry. Especially important would be the profe
itability of the industry because increased prof-
itability would lead to greater entry (and lower
profitability would lead to less entry) all other
things equal. However, to control for variations
in profitability properly is difficult because
profitability itself depends on entry restrictions
(that is, it is endogenous). (In fact, the whole
point of entry restrictions is to increase
profitability.)
Although Peltzman included profitability as
a control variable, he ignored its endogeneity.
Thus, his estimates may have been less reliable
than estimates that ignored potential (exoge-
nous) changes in profitability altogether. Byne-
glecting the fact that limited entry itself WOQld
increase profitability, he likely overestimated
the effect of the Act on deterring entry.
A more recent (1974) re-analysisof Peltz-
man's data by Linda and FranklinEdwards tries
to address the endogeneity of profitability.8
They argue that although Peltzman overstatedoL..---&_.............JI....--'-_"'---J._..&....--I._...I
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Chart 1
Entry Rates for Commercial Banks, 1921-1983
Percent
because this is the only consistent definition in
the published data across the whole 1921-1983
period, and partly because re-openings also
represent a new source ofcompetition. Because
entry rates might be somewhat overstated by
this procedure, especially during 1933 and 1934
when the number of re-openings was very
large, I have excluded datafor these years from
the analysis. This has the effect of reducing the
average entry rate during the free-banking
period.
For the period 1921-1935, the average rate
of entry was about 1.7 percent per year. In con-
trast, during the 1936-1962 period, the average
rate of entry declined to only .7 percent a year,
a statistically significant decline (see Chart 1).
This decline of approximately 50 percent is ap-
proximately the same magnitude found by
Peltzman using his more complex but flawed
statistical procedure. Thus, the evidence sup-
portsthenotion that there was a significant de-
cline in the rate of bank entry during the period
following the passage of the Banking Act of
1935 until 1962.
On November 15,1961, James Saxon was ap-
pointed Comptroller of the Currency. He was
widely regarded as a proponent of the national
banking system and was viewed as being much
more liberal than his predecessors in his char-
tering policies. The data in Chart 1suggest that
initially his policies did have a significant effect
I.. Post-Saxon Era
Free·Banking




the effects ofchartering restrictions, his conclu-
sion that chartering restrictions substantially
limited the rate of entry is valid.
Below, I take another look at these data and
t=)(tel1cl.tl1t=.al1alysis fr()Il1.1962 ..through 1983, the
last year for which complete data are currently
available. I do not attempt to control for the
effects of varying profitability on entry because
of the difficulty in properly controlling (statisti-
cally) for the effect of regulation on
profitability.
A Further Analysis
Although the Banking Act of 1935 did ap-
parently substantially lessen state-federal com-
petition for the chartering ofinsured banks dur-
ing the 1936-1962 period, there was still
interagency competition between the FDIC,
the Comptroller, and the Federal Reserve.9
More recently, as S&Ls have gained more
and more bank-like powers, the FHLBB may
have increased the degree of competition
among federal agencies for chartering. Because
of this actual and potential competition among
chartering agencies, it may well be that charter-
ing would become a less and less effective re-
striction to entry over time. Below, we look at
entry rates during the post-1962 period in ad-
dition to those during the 1921-1962 period
analyzed by Peltzman to see whether entry rates
have remained low or increased.
Entry rates (the number of banks opening in
year t divided by the number of existing banks
at year t-l) are plotted in Chart 1. The sources
of the data used to calculate entry rates are the
same as those used by Peltzman and are de-
scribed in the Data Appendix. For the free-
banking period, 1921-1935, it is somewhat dif-
ficult to define entry properly because of the
relatively large number of reopenings of pre-
viously suspended banks and the difficulty in
distinguishing new openings from re-openings.
The re-openings of suspended banks was es-
pecially high during the 1931-1935 period be-
fore FDIC insurance reduced the number of
bank failures.
I have chosen to define entry as simply the
number ofbanks opening regardless of whether
they were new openings or re-openings, partly
10Chart 2
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ment in which entry restrictions have been
effectively eliminated or at least have been sub-
stantially relaxed. If so, deposit-rate deregula-
tion should have little or no long-run effects on
the profitability of the banking industry as a
whole because free entry ensures that, in the
long-run, profitability will be at normal, com-
petitive levels.
However, individual banks may have differ-
ent experiences as they make the transition
from nonprice to price competition. 11 Further,
if entry restrictigns. had been effectively re-
moved prior to cleregulation, then deregula-
tion, by eliminating the inefficiencies inherent
in nonprice competition, should have led to an
expansion of the.banking industry relative to its
nonbank competitors and this in turn would in-
crease incentives for entry. The effects of de-
regulation may explain the very high entry rates
of the last few years shown in Chart 1. They
are also consistent with anecdotal evidence that
there has been a recent surge in new bank start-
ups (see Brannigan 1985).
on raising entryrates. However, by thelast year
ofhis tenure (1966), entry rates had fallen back
to. the pre-Saxon level. Then, beginning in
1968,entry rates again began a sharp upward
ris~.al1cl<:Ql1til111.~(jJQJgllgwacy<:1i<:a1.patt~m
unique to the post-1962 period.
Looking at the 1962-1983 period as a whole,
entry rates averaged essentially the same as
during the 1921-1935 period. Thus, itilPpears
that Saxon began an era where entry intobank-
ing was no more difficult than during the "free-
banking" era. Ifcorrect, this means that bank-
ing has been a more competitive industry, at
least since 1962. 10.However, another interpre-
tation ofthe data in Chart 1would be that entry
restrictions were gradually relaxed beginning
perhaps as early as 1950 since the data ,:"ould
not be inconsistent with an upward trend m en-
try rates starting then. In either event, entry
now does not appear to be significantly re-
stricted, at least compared to the free-banking
era.
Looking at entry in banking only in terms of
entry by new banking organizations probably
understates entry because of the possibility of
entry through branching, entry by S&Ls, and
increased competition by nondepository insti-
tutions (such as Merrill Lynch). For example,
although the total number of banking and S&L
offices was relatively constant from 1934 to the
early 1950s, the number of offices has almost
tripled since then (see Chart 2), and the num-
ber of offices per real deposit dollar has shown
an upward trend since 1962 (although it has not
reached anywhere near the level of the 1920s
and 1930s).
The recent deregulation of banking, specifi-
cally the removal of consumer deposit-rate ceil-
ings, appears to be taking place in an environ-
m. Conclusions
The data on bank entry suggest that the reg-
ulation of entry through chartering has been
much less restrictive in the post-Saxon era.
Since 1962, entry rates have on average been
equal to those before 1936, a period d~ring
which, it is argued, entry was relatively
unrestricted.
If, in fact, bank entry has been unrestricted
since 1962, then various anticompetitive regu-
lations, such as deposit rate ceilings, would not
have been effective in reducing the degree of
competition in banking. (They would, however,
have made the banking industry less efficient.)
This in turn means that bank profits were
11not enhanced (or at least are not currently
being .enhanced)by •. these anticompetitive
restrictions.
If the degree of competition and banking
pr()fitshave been atthelevelthey\Vo\ll(j have
been without entry restrictions, then deregula-
tion ofconsumer deposit rates is .unlikely to af-
fect banking profits or the degree of competi-
tion, at least in the long-run. Thus, the current
calls to reregulate banking-to reduce compe-
tition and bolster bank profits-to stem the re-
cent spate of bank failures are not focusing on
the real causes of these failures.
Data Appendix
All commercial banking data except those so
noted, including the number of· banks and
branches1 in existence in a given year, the num-
ber of new "primary" qrganizationsandthe to-
tal deposits data:2,come from publications of
the Board of Governors (BOG) of the Federal
Reserve System (FRS).
Stfries for the 1921-1940 period3 come from
the U.S. BOG of the FRS, Supplement to
Banking qnd Monetary Stqtistics, Se.ction I,
1962. (Note: This supplement was originally re-
leased in Sections in 1943 as a revised version
of available data frorn the period 1914-1941. It
was published in 1962.)
The 1941-1970 series. are from the U.S. BOG
of the FRS..Banking and Monetary Statistics,
1941-1970, 1976.
Data for·the197D-1979 period were taken
from the Annual Statistical Digest, 1970-1979,
published jl) 1981 by the BOG.
Since 1979, the Annual Statistical Digest has
been published yearly, and they were used on
ayearly basisfrom 1980 through 1982.
Data for 1983 for commen:ial banks,
branches, new openings, and total deposits
were obtained directly from the BOG; 1983
data on savings and loans was obtaineddirectly
from the FHLBB.
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Although these data areJrom several differ-
entpublications ..(of primarily the ..·same
sources), all series are consistently defined,
with the exception of those indicated.
1 Commercial bank branch·data for the year 1920-1934
were obtained from the Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970,Patt 2, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1975.
Branch data for thrifts was collected ffom the SaVings and
Home Financing Source Book, 1952-1955, U.S. Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, and the Savings and Loan Fact
Book, 1962, 1965, 1980, U.S. League of Savings Associa-
tion, and represent total insureq (federal- and state-char-
tered) savings and loan associations.
2 Total deposits dat<i for s<ivings <ind loan associations were
t<iken from the Source Book (see <ibove citing;), 1955, Fed-
er<il Horne Loan Bank BO<ird, for the years prior to 1955.
Citib<isewas used from 1955 to 1983 (actually from BOG
FRB Table 1.7).
Total Real Deposits were c<iJcul<ited using an implicit price
deflator (wholesale) from the Historical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (see <ibove).
Total Offices per r.eal deposit. dollar W<iS c<iJcul<itedby divid-
ing tot<ilbank <ind thrift offices by the sum of their .tot<il
re<il deposits.
3 The 1921-1940 portion ofthe tot<il number ofcommerci<il
b<inks in existence (<it ye<ir-end) series W<iS multiplied by a
factor of 1.003919373 to correct for <i ch<inge in the series
definition from "All Incorpor<ited" to "All Commercial"
b<inks after 1940.FOOTNOTES
1. The legal status ofnonbank banks was unclear atthe
time this article· went to•press.
2. Failures are less likely in an industry where firms are
earning above normal profits (Elc;:onomic rents). Insuch in-
Qustries;.ittakesal€lrQElrrandQmshocktoreduclOdemand
or increase costs to make earnings (or net worth) negative
and drive the firm out of business.
3. Chartering regulation, branching restrictions, and prod-
ucHne regulation are. aU forms of entry regulation.
4. Throughout this paper, I use the definition ofa barrier
to Elntry that was first formul(lted by GeorgeStigler(1968b):
"A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing
(at some or every rate of Output) which must be borne by
a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by
firms already in the industry."
Free or unrestricted entry means there are no barriers to
entry. This concept of a barrier to entry contrasts sharply
with the view that any cost of doing business is a cost of
entry. That.is, I do not view capital requirements (or land
or labor requirements for that matter) as costs of entry per
se, as opposed to costs of doing business.
5. See Gilbert (1984) for a review of this literature.
6. See Keeley (1984) for evidence supporting this notion.
7. See Keeley and Zimmerman (1985) for an elaboration
of this argumElnt.
8. However, they do not employ a simultaneous equations
technique. Thus,one may also question the validity of their
estimates.
9. See Kenneth Scott (1979).
10. An alternative hypothesis consistent with these data is
that some other force, such as an exogenous increase in
banking profitability, caused the rate of entry to increase
during these yea~s. However, it seems unlikely that an in-
crease in profitability would persist over a 20-year period.
11. It is conceivable that deregulation might have a short-
rUn negative effect on profitability as specific capital us~d
to support nonprice competition depreciates in value. How-
ever, this factor would have no lasting effect if entry had
been unrestricted prior to deregulation.
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